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Abstract: Research on political parties has long identified 
“environmental” pressures upon parties to undertake organisational 
and programmatic reforms – this applies in particular to “catch-all” 
parties or Volksparteien.  Changed social and media structures, the 
decline of organisations traditionally associated with the parties, and 
the growth in alternative possibilities of political participation create 
significant organisational – as well as programmatic – challenges.  This 
paper compares the German CDU and the British Conservatives in two 
respects: in particular it focuses on their organisational responses to 
the election defeats they suffered at the end of the 1990s, examining 
those reforms which took place and consider whether these match the 
expectations of organisational reforms anticipated by proponents of the 
“cartel party thesis”.  While in both cases there are similarities, but (in 
particular in the German case) it is important not to understate the 
extent of internal party resistance to reform, and thus the difficulties 
with which aspiring party reformers are confronted.  This conclusion 
suggests, more broadly, that in reality the process of party change is 
more than an almost automatic, isomorphic, and  inevitable response 
to a changing environment.  Rather it is punctuated, messy, and often 
contingent on events and agents. 
 
1. Introduction: changing parties in a changing world? 
 
Since the early and important works of Duverger (1954) and Michels (1962), there 
has been tremendous scholarly interest in the development of party organisations, 
and party organisational change.  This reflects the important consequences that may 
flow from political parties’ organisational forms: different modes of organisation (for 
instance, the relationship between leaders and members, the methods of candidate 
selection, the nature of electoral campaigning and fundraising, or the interaction 
between different levels) may have a profound impact upon parties’ policy choices, 
their strategic positioning and their electoral success.  Interest is also a function of a 
divide in the literature between accounts which assume - sometimes implicitly – that 
long-to-medium term changes in the environments in which parties operate will 
sooner or later lead to party change and those who see the latter triggered, in 
punctuated fashion, by particular events or people, most obviously electoral reverses 
and turnovers in leadership.. 
 
The Conservatives and the CDU are interesting to compare.  They enjoy similar 
positions as the major party on the centre-right of the political spectrum in their 
respective polities and are thus most similar cases.  Albeit in different ways they 
have - historically anyway – both operated as relatively decentralised organisations: 
in the CDU, there were horizontal division between factions and vertical divisions 
between the different Länder (Schmid 1990), while in the Conservative Party, a form 
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of “stratarchy” existed before the term was popularised by scholars like Katz and 
Mair (1995 and 1997), with Central Office (as party HQ was known) being neither a 
creature of the leadership nor really in control of local constituency associations (see 
Pinto-Duschinksy, 1972; see also Webb, 2000: 192-9).  At the same time, the 
parties’ institutional environments differ radically, with the centralised and legally 
relatively laissez-faire British institutional context contrasting sharply with that of 
German federalism and a prescriptive Party Law.  This paper considers the reforms 
undertaken when each party suffered a major electoral shock (followed by further 
convulsions) around a decade-and-a-half ago, when the British Conservatives found 
themselves on the receiving end of New Labour’s l1997 landslide and the CDU was 
ignominiously booted out of office at the hands of an SPD-Green coalition one year 
later.  Neither party was able to stage a rapid or impressive comeback: in the UK 
further election defeats in 2001 and 2005 were followed by a less-than-triumphant 
return to power as part of a coalition in 2010; in Germany, a second defeat in 2002 
was followed by rather mixed results in 2005 and 2010, although on both occasions 
the CDU was at least able to return to government. 
 
Britain and Germany, like other European democracies, have both experienced 
substantial and, for parties anyway, disruptive changes (see Krouwel, 2012)  Social 
structures have evolved, with a tendency towards individualisation and changed lines 
of political conflict.  Patterns of family and social organisation have also changed, 
meaning that political socialisation occurs differently, leading to much higher levels of 
electoral volatility.  Further important changes commonly pointed to – although 
sometimes overblown (see Allern and Bale, 2012) – include secularisation and the 
loosening of.links with civil society and interest groups.  This not only contributes to 
higher electoral volatility, as socialisation into a particular milieu is less likely to 
shape voting behaviour, but it also leads to organisational challenges for political 
parties, since such movements may become a less fertile source of members, 
activists, and also channels of communication.  Moreover, there are now so many 
other ways that those who want to participate in politics can get involved, with 
“citizens preferring to invest their efforts elsewhere, and particularly in groups where 
they can play a more active role, where they are more likely to be in full agreement 
with a narrower range of concerns, and where they feel they can make a difference” 
(Katz / Mair 1997: 105).  The astonishing spread of the internet as a means of 
communication, has opened up new opportunities for political parties, in both 
external and internal communications, but may be renderering traditional (but in 
some ways still functional) ways of keeping up contact redundant. 
 
In the German context, reunification also had a profound impact upon the context in 
which political parties operated.  The near-absence of established organisational 
structures of political parties (apart from the post-Communist PDS, later renamed the 
Left Party), the absence of long-standing ties between parties and citizens (reflected 
both in higher electoral volatility and lower turnout), as well as a radically different 
social structure (with lower levels both of religious observance and trade union 
members) all prevented a western organisational structure seeming optimal.  This 
led to east German parties having a very different organisational structure to their 
western equivalents, with a focus on capital-intensive campaigning rather than on 
voluntary work by members (Grabow 2001). 
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Katz and Mair (1995) point to certain organisational reforms, which, crucially, they 
link to changes in wider social structure.  The first concerns “professionalisation”, 
with “politics as profession” becoming the “principal goal of politics”, rather than, in 
earlier phases of party development, social reform or amelioration being parties’ 
principle goal (Katz / Mair 1997: 110).  Moreover, political competition is on the basis 
of “managerial skills and efficiency”, and party politics is recognised as “a full-time 
career” (ibid: 116).  Secondly, there is an important shift in the internal balance of 
power.  Ostensibly, parties appear to become internally more “democratic”, with a 
shift in power away from middle-ranking functionaries towards individual members 
(and members being treated as individuals rather than an organised body).  In fact, 
because organisation amongst the mass of members is more difficult than amongst 
a network of functionaries, this can lead to what Webb (1994: 120, cited in Hopkin 
2001: 351) terms “democratization as emasculation”, where party leaderships in fact 
gain, rather than lose power.  On a related point, the boundary between members 
and non-members will, according to Katz and Mair (1997: 109-113), be eroded.  This 
might manifest itself in holding primaries involving non-members in candidate 
selection, or incorporating non-members into policy-development processes, or 
indeed campaigning.  Accountability of elected politicians to the party members is 
weakened, and instead they are increasingly seen as accountable to the wider 
electorate.  There may also be ideological consequences to such developments, if, 
as is often assumed, inactive party members are closer to the median voter than 
party activists (and indeed non-members are closer to the median voter than 
members) (Hopkin 2001: 351). 
 
 
According to Katz and Mair (1997) here are two other features of the cartel party 
organisation which flow from the changed nature of parties’ environment.  The nature 
of election campaigning changes, with a shift towards “capital-intensive” approaches, 
with less need for the (reduced and sometimes disempowered) membership and 
activist base to be involved in labour-intensive campaign activity (ibid.: 113).  
Moreover, parties become less reliant, in this account, on members as a source of 
finance, instead relaying “increasingly for their resources on the subventions and 
other benefits and privileges which are afforded by the state” (ibid: 113).  All this 
reinforces a tendency toward centralisation although Katz and Mair (1997: 114) note 
that there is still some advantage to parties in having local office-holders (in 
encouraging involvement and participation), provided these do not act as the basis 
for the “mobilisation of challenges” to the party leadership.  Accordingly a “stratarchy” 
of mutually autonomous levels of party organisation is expected to emerge. 
 
 
Other accounts acknowledge these environmental drivers of change but lay equal (if 
not more) emphasis on less amorphous sources of change (both endogenous and 
exogenous) and, indeed, on inertia in party organisations.  Michels (1962) and his 
“iron law of oligarchy” of course stresses the likelihood of centralisation in party 
organisation, and this trend is also identified in Kirchheimer’s work on the “catch-all 
party” (Kirchheimer 1966).  Panebianco (1998: 264) sets out the model of the 
“electoral-professional party” which, in organisational terms at least, has much in 
common with the “cartel party” – equally emphasising the likelihood of the “central 
role of the professionals”, the “appeal to the ‘opinion electorate’”, a “pre-eminence of 
the public representatives [in party organisation]”, and “financing through interest 
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groups and public funds”.  However, unlike Katz and Mair, Panebianco is at pains to 
stress that there is no automatic move from a change in a party’s environment to a 
change in its organisation: 
 
“The most persuasive hypothesis … is that organisational change is … the 
effect of an external stimulus (environmental and/or technological) which joins 
forces with internal factors which were themselves undermining the power 
structure. ... When neither environmental challenges nor internal 
preconditions are present, organizational change cannot take place.” 
(Panebianco, 1998: 244, our emphasis). 
 
Katz and Mair have also been criticised (for instance by Kitschelt, 2000) for having 
inadequate “microfoundations” (encompassing an explanation of actors’ choices) for 
their theory of change.  Meanwhile,Harmel and Janda contend party change does 
not “just happen” (1994: 261) in response to environmental pressures, and they 
stress that proponents of organisational change may face a “wall of resistance” (ibid: 
261).  Instead, Harmel and Janda emphasise the potential importance of “leadership 
change, a change of dominant faction within the party, and/or an external stimulus 
for change” (ibid: 262) – this external stimulus is a held often to take the form of a 
“shock”, which is “so directly related to performance considerations on a party’s 
‘primary goal’ that it causes the party’s decision-makers … to undertake a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the party’s effectiveness on that goal dimension” (ibid.: 
268).  There is, then, no necessary link between a change in a party’s environment 
and organisational change, unless that environmental change leads to a 
fundamental “shock” causing the party to question whether it can fulfil its raison 
d’être.   
 
This paper will consider signficant attempts at reform in the UK Conservative Party 
and the German CDU.  In particular, two expectations stemming from Katz and 
Mair’s cartel party thesis will be considered: 
 
1. Whether organisational reforms have led to a power shift in the parties.  We 
might expect either centralisation, or alternatively the formation of a 
stratarchy, with mutually independent local and national elites.   A related but 
distinct issue is the role of leaderships, middle-level functionaries and 
members: as suggested above, we might expect to see a shift of power 
upwards towards leaderships and downwards towards members. 
 
2. Whether there is evidence of professionalisation in the party, in terms of its 
organisation of campaigning and of its party careers, both in terms of career 
paths and goals, and also the organisation of the parties. 
 
 
This paper will show that, in both cases, there is some evidence of those changes 
drawn from the environment in which political parties operate that we might expect 
from Katz and Mair’s “cartel party” analysis.  However, party organisational change is 
substantially shaped both by the differing institutional contexts but also, more 
broadly, by the fact that it is often a slow, messy and contingent process, with 
internal actors able to shape, and potentially to scupper reforms.  As a result, 
accounts of party organisational development need to acknowledge two things.  The 
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first is that a feedback loop exists between endogenous and exogenous drivers of 
change which means we have to do more than merely infer an almost automatic, 
isomorphic connection between environmental and party change.  The second is 
that, in part because “parties are conservative organizations and resist change” 
(Harmel and Janda 1994: 248), change is therefore often punctuated and contingent 
rather than slow-burn and sure-fire.  To recognise the latter is not, of course, to deny 
a role for path dependency.  Indeed, the latter helps explain, for instance, why the 
Conservative Party has seen substantially more reform in recent years than has the 
CDU,.  In fact, Harmel and Janda’s claim that “propensity of a party to change is 
inversely related to party age” (ibid.: 282) can, on the basis of this analysis, be 
qualified: not only party age but also the degree to which a particular structure is 
embedded will shape the extent to which the organisation reforms.  So, for instance, 
in the case of the CDU, the existence of decentralisation and powerful middle-
ranking functionaries has a tendency to stymie the empowerment of individual 
members and of party HQ.  As a result, we point to an almost paradoxical finding – 
the tragedy of party change if you like – namely that, in cases where incongruity with 
optimal organisational structure is greatest, and thus the greatest environmental 
pressure to depart from established structures exists, reforms are likely to be hardest 
to realise. 
 
 
2. Organisational reforms in the UK Conservatives post-1997 
 
a. Power shift in the Conservative Party? 
 
Prior to 1998, the Conservative Party enjoyed a unique, “tripartite” organisational 
structure.  The leader was chosen by the Conservative MPs, in a secret ballot, and 
(in theory at least) oversaw Conservative Central Office, with its professional staff.  
Located in the same building, the National Union of Conservative and Unionist 
Associations served as an “umbrella” for the many Constituency Associations, 
whose role included the selection of candidates for public office.  The “party’s” 
annual conference was convened by the National Union  but had no formal (and very 
little informal) influence over the policies pursued by the leadership and, by 
extension, the parliamentary party (see Bale, 2012). 
 
Under the newly-elected leader, William Hague, following their 1997 election defeat, 
the Conservatives set about organisational, rather than programmatic renewal, under 
the banner Fresh Future.  In so doing, the were prompted both by the scale of the 
election defeat and the pent-up anger of grassroots members who felt they had been 
betrayed by disunited and sleazy MPs, as well as by a feeling that organisational 
reform was more pressing than programmatic reform, and would in any case be 
more readily achievable (Bale 2011: 74; Webb 2000: 195).  Fresh Future 
fitted rather closely the twin expectations of centralisation of power with the party 
leadership and headquarters, on the one hand, and empowerment of individual 
members on the other.  Individual members were to be given the chance to choose 
the Conservative Party’s leader for the very first time, even if that choice were to be 
limited to deciding between two candidates chosen by ballot by the parliamentary 
party.  At the same time, there were substantial elements of centralisation: for the 
first time, there would be a national membership list and, even more importantly the 
voluntary, professional and parliamentary sides of the party were brought together 
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into a single organisation; moreover, party headquarters was afforded new rights to 
both set goals (for instance, with regard to membership and fundraising) and take 
action against recalcitrant local associations (Bale 2011: 75).  Local associations, 
however, gained no real say over policy,.  In a final flourish confirming the role of 
individual members, the final decision upon the new structure was referred to a one-
member, one-vote ballot amongst party members, which came out overwhelmingly in 
favour of reform.   
 
Nonetheless, there were some difficulties in the implementation of the Fresh Future 
reforms.  For instance, although one motivation of the reforms was to increase the 
flow of resources to the party’s headquarters from associations, attempts by the 
centre to approach local members directly for cash were rebuffed by associations, 
leaving the party’s headquarters (not for the first time!) substantially overdrawn and 
delaying investment in IT (Bale 2011: 76-7).  In addition, following the election of 
another unsuitable and unsuccessful leader, Iain Duncan Smith, in 2001, the 
Conservatives again reviewed their procedures for electing a leader, anxious 
following a third successive election defeat in 2005 that members (potentially more 
remote from the median voter than Conservative parliamentarians) should not 
lumber the party with another loser.  Specifically, the leadership (under pressure 
from the parliamentary party) proposed that the choice of leader would once again 
become the exclusive property of the party’s MPs, who would only be obliged to 
consult their constituency associations. This proposal – which was combined with a 
number of other organisational changes widely seen to favour the elite over ordinary 
members – sparked a backlash from some MPs, from the Party’s former Chief 
Executive, and marked the beginning of the now extraordinarily influential 
Conservative Home website as self-styled spokesman for the Tory grassroots (Bale 
2011: 266).  The rule change failed to gain the required two-thirds majority in the 
“National Convention” (of representatives of Conservative Associations). 
 
As a result, the Party’s new leader was elected at the end of 2005 under the system 
established in 1998.  That system did not, however, prevent the election of a so-
called ‘moderniser’ and, nor, since the Fresh Future reforms had never placed any 
limitations on the ability of whoever was chosen as leader to decide policy, did it 
prevent the successful candidate, David Cameron, setting about a programme of 
policy renewal - one that, in fact, fits neatly with Katz and Mair’s expectations of 
centrally-steered policy development, which is then ratified, in a plebiscitary fashion, 
by party members.  A vague statement of the party’s modernised values that would 
apparently inform the policy specifics still to come, Built to Last, was put to the 
membership in 2006, and was duly affirmed by an overwhelming majority, albeit on 
an embarrassingly unenthusiastic turnout of just 27% (Bale 2011: 313).Cameron 
also proposed changes to the Party’s candidate selection procedure.  Until 2005, 
local Conservative associations were essentially free to choose from a long list of 
candidates approved by the centre.  Cameron instead insisted on the following 
changes: 
 
 A “priority list”, popularly known as the “A-list” of candidates was created (as a 
sub-set of the previous national list, which comprised 50% women and 20% 
candidates from black and minority ethnic backgrounds, and in particular at 
early stages of the selections of more promising seats, Associations were 
required to choose a candidate from this list (Parliament 2010; Wigbers 2012); 
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 Holding an “open primary”, whereby all self-declared Conservative supporters 
could attend and vote upon the candidate to be chosen from the final shortlist 
declared by the local association, became a requirement for Conservative 
Associations with under 300 members, and became an option for others 
(Wigbers 2012); 
 
These reforms, including the creation of the “priority list” reflected a clear desire to 
increase the diversity of the Parliamentary Party, but in doing so it quite 
controversially eroded the autonomy of the leading functionaries in local 
Conservative Associations in several ways: first, Conservative Central Office, in 
offering to local associations a far smaller pool of candidates to choose from, was in 
practice able to steer the composition of the types of candidate chosen far more 
tightly.  Moreover, the hurdle for a local “favoured son” in a promising constituency 
would be significantly higher, as not only would he be required to be accepted onto 
the approved list, but he would also have to meet the far higher bar of inclusion upon 
the priority list.  Finally, at the “long-listing” stage of selecting a candidate, subtle 
pressure was applied upon local association members (with even David Cameron 
apparently dropping by on occasion: Bale 2011, 301), and indeed, for some 
selections closer to the General Election, the final shortlist was agreed jointly 
between Conservative Central Office and the local association (Parliament 2010: Ev 
445).   
 
It was the priority list which proved most controversial (Bale 2011: 301-2)  Criticism 
came from members with a strong belief that Conservative candidates needed local 
connections to the constituencies they contested, from defenders of the autonomy of 
local associations and from those who (perhaps because they were meritocrats, 
perhaps because they were sexist, or perhaps because they were aspiring 
candidates worried about losing out) were opposed to what they dubbed a ‘politically 
correct’ move to get more women into the parliamentary party (see Childs and 
Webb, 2011) .  In practice, in the run-up to the 2010 election, there was a constant 
tussle for power over candidate selection between Conservative Central Office and 
local associations – and, although the resulting process certainly reflected a 
substantial centralisation in power, there had to be some compromise, the leadership 
deciding in January 2007, for instance, that associations could choose from the 
bigger approved list rather than the Priority List but that women should make up half 
the places on their final shortlists  Perhaps surprisingly given experience elsewhere, 
the insistence upon open primaries proved less contentious, because pilots were 
held prior to the 2005 election in a handful of constituencies but also perhaps 
because membership of the Conservative Party has traditionally operated on 
something of a sliding scale, with an accent on social rather than political, card-
carrying participation .  Prior to the 2010 election, primaries were held in 116 cases, 
and 48 of those candidates were elected to the House of Commons (Wigbers 2012).  
In two cases, the primary took the format of a postal ballot to all registered electors.  
Although local functionaries still remained in charge of the shortlist in these cases, 
the final decision was placed to a limited extent (in the case of primaries held at a 
meeting) and a large extent (in the case of the two all-postal primaries) outside the 
control of local members, neatly conforming to Katz and Mair’s expectations. 
 
It might have been anticipated that, with the introduction of devolved political 
institutions in 1998 (with first elections taking place in 1999), there would be a 
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measure of decentralisation introduced into Conservative Party organisation in 
Scotland and Wales.  Initially, however, this only happened to a very limited degree 
(Fabre, 2008), almost certainly because the party north of the border had a long 
history of autonomy anyway while legislative and executive devolution in Wales 
(where the party was fully integrated with that in England) was in any case much 
more limited Following the Conservatives’ poor showing in Scotland in the 2010 
election, the Sanderson Report (Scottish Conservatives, 2010) argued for some 
organisational reforms, including, most significantly, the direct election of a leader of 
the Scottish Conservatives on a One-Member, One-Vote basis.  The creation of this 
potentially powerful post therefore represents some decentralisation in response to 
the “environmental” pressure of a change in political institutions.  Indeed, the change 
might have gone even further had not the resulting election seen the defeat of Murdo 
Fraser, who had argued for the creation of a completely autonomous Scottish 
Conservative Party (but one whose MPs would take the Conservative whip at 
Westminster) (BBC 2011). 
 
b. Professionalisation in the Conservative Party? 
 
From 1997 onwards, there was some a shift towards professionalisation in the 
Conservatives’ campaigning operation.  Turnover in Conservative Central Office 
reflected a desire to reshape it into a “modern political communications outfit” (Bale 
2011: 78) although the increased involvement of ‘outsiders’ can be overdone since 
the Conservatives had for decades used external advertising agencies, contracted 
consultants and pollsters to advise on campaigning.  The Party faced clear 
pressures to draw upon “capital-intensive” campaigning methods of the sort 
envisaged by Katz and Mair, since a party membership with an average age of over 
60 in the mid-1990s (Bale 2011: 405) might struggle to deliver energetic grassroots 
campaigning.  Prior to the 2005 election, the party purchased “Voter Vault” software 
(inspired by the US Republicans), layering demographic data upon the electoral 
register (Denham / O’Hara 2007: 183), and Fisher and Denver found a start up-
swing in levels of “modernisation” in election campaigning (using such technologies 
as telephone canvassing and direct mail), although there was also an increase, for 
the 2005, in more traditional forms of campaign activity (Fisher / Denver 2009: 199-
201).  The party also made substantial attempts to improve its web presence (Bale 
2011).   
 
However, the most significant (if initially slow) improvement after 1997 – in part 
prompted by pressure by advisers like the Australian Lynton Crosby and Lord 
Ashcroft – was in local organisation.  Pattie and Johnston note that, over time, the 
organisational reforms designed to maximise the party’s number of seats at election 
time appeared to bear fruit: whereas in 1997 and 2001, nearly as much money was 
spent in “safe” as in “marginal” constituencies, suggesting misplaced effort due to the 
intransigence of local members, in 2005 this had started to change, with 
campaigning expenditure suggesting a more rational allocation of resources (Pattie / 
Johnston 2009: 419); this process appeared to have continued into 2010 (Pattie / 
Johnston 2010: 501).  Given that a great deal of the resources thrown at marginal 
constituencies came in the form of call-centres and targeted communications rather 
than doorknocking by dogged local activists.  – The start of this shift occurred 
outside CCHQ: Lord Ashcroft’s operation was before 2005 a private one and a thorn 
in the side of a leadership (a leadership in which he had no confidence).  Under 
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David Cameron, Lord Ashcorft was persuaded to become an integral part of the 
Conservative Campaign Head Quarters, and thus the change in the nature of 
campaigning has to be seen as part of rather than in contradistinction to the 
professionalised, centralised operation predicted by Katz and Mair.   
 
The types of candidates selected and elected by the Conservatives were not 
radically different from their immediate predecessors, (Bale 2011: 302), almost 
certainly continuing the trend toward a ‘political class’ identified across Europe (see 
Cotta and Best, 2007).  That said, the money spent on getting them there came from 
private not public sources – one aspect, at least in which the Conservatives (and 
other British parties) depart markedly, and perhaps not unexpectedly (Detterbeck, 
2005), from the cartel party model. 
 
 
 
c. Summary 
 
Overall, there is indeed some evidence in the UK’s Conservative Party of change in 
response to environmental pressures, as Katz and Mair anticipated.  The evidence is 
strongest for suggestions that power has shifted upwards towards the party 
leadership (seen as a collective rather than as an individual – the latter, after all, has 
always been preeminent), and downwards towards individual members and away 
from activists, as well as some blurring of the boundary between members and non-
members.  This shift started with the Fresh Future reforms of 1998, and was 
particularly evident in changes to candidate selection processes introduced after 
David Cameron’s election as party leader in 2005,leading to a noticeable increase  
(albeit from a low base) in the proportion of female and BME Conservative MPs,).  
When it comes to professionalisation, too, there is evidence of a steady switch 
towards capital-intensive campaigning focused upon constituencies where it is most 
needed.  Outside professionals continued to be drawn upon by the party when 
needed to support campaigns, and most of those elected continued, unsurprisingly, 
to have begun their political careers with the party early on, either as local 
representatives, researchers and advisors, or both. 
 
Nonetheless, even in this case developments should not be regarded as unequivocal 
confirmation of Katz and Mair’s assumption of environmental isomorphism.  First of 
all, the two biggest sets of changes (the Fresh Future reforms and reforms to 
candidate selection) occurred straight after election defeats and were immediately 
pursued by a newly-elected party leader.  This therefore offers strong support to 
Harmel and Janda’s claim that contingency and agency are also important in 
understanding party change, and in particular suggests they are right to focus on 
change in the party’s leadership.  After all, it took three election defeats before there 
was a substantial erosion of local associations’ power over candidate selection, 
pointing to considerable reluctance by party leaders to confront local functionaries.  
When centralising reforms to candidate selection were brought about, they proved 
highly controversial and difficult to realise, requiring significant investment of the 
leader’s political capital, and an ongoing negotiation and renegotiation between the 
levels of the party.  The structural resistance of party organisation to change which 
Harmel and Janda anticipated.  was also evidenced by the defeat of proposals to 
reform the selection process for the party leader proposed in 2005.  More generally, 
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the case of the UK does not support Katz and Mair’s expectations of increased state 
funding. In short, there was  organisational transformation in the direction 
anticipated, but it was partial, punctuated rather than steady,, and blocked in some 
areas, testifying to the slow and contingent nature of party change.   
 
 
3. Organisational reforms in the German CDU post 1998 
 
 
a. Power shift in the CDU? 
 
The formal structure of the CDU have remained substantially unaltered since the 
1960s, and indeed formally appears to bear many of the hallmarks of Katz and 
Mair’s characterisation of the “mass party” (Katz / Mair 2007: 95).  The lowest level 
of organisation is the branch, or Ortsverband, of which there are over 11,000.  This is 
followed by the level of the District, or Kreis, which is the lowest level of the 
organisation enjoying some constitutional and financial autonomy.  In some, larger 
states (or Länder), there is an intermediate level (termed a Bezirksverband) before 
the level of the state party, the Landesverband, which exists in fifteen of Germany’s 
sixteen states (the CDU does not organise in Bavaria, where instead its sister party, 
the CSU, represents Christian Democracy).  Representatives of the Kreis- , Bezirks- 
and Landesverbände between them elect the 1,001 representatives of the federal 
conference, which itself elects the party leader and other office holders, a “core 
executive” (termed the Präsidium), and the large and rather unwieldy party executive 
committee, which includes those in the Präsidium, and at least 26 further members.  
Alongside these structures, there are various affiliated interest groups within the 
CDU, such as those representing working-class members, business people, women, 
young people, lesbians and gay men, and those with a background in the formerly 
German territories in eastern and central Europe (Koecke / Sieben 2010). 
 
Importantly, the picture of the CDU’s organisation which emerges is not one of 
mutually independent layers, but rather one where there are significant linkages 
between the different levels: for instance, CDU Minister Presidents of each state are 
often represented in the Präsidium in their own right, while all chairs of each 
Landesverband attend the party’s executive – so the organisation is interlocking, 
rather than a stratarchy (Schmid 2008: 72).  Indeed, it is this feature which has 
allowed political parties to often serve as an important forum to mediate conflicts 
within the Federal Republic of Germany (Lehmbruch 2003). 
 
Since the 1998 election defeat, internal reforms to the CDU have been far more 
modest in character than in the case of the British Conservative Party.  The most 
significant changes went the banner of the Bürgerpartei (“Citizens’ Party”) project of 
2003, when a commission led by the then General-Secretary (and thus head of the 
party’s organisation, answerable between conferences to the party leader), Laurenz 
Meyer, proposed some changes to the party’s conference (CDU 2003).  The 
introduction to the proposals sounded radical: “In the modern citizens’ society, the 
CDU has to secure its future as a people’s party, even under the constantly changing 
conditions of social-structural change and modern communication” (ibid.: 1).  
However, in practice the changes proposed were extremely modest: even such 
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proposals as limiting the number of offices an individual could hold were defeated in 
the run-up to the conference (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2003). 
 
The Bürgerpartei changes did, however, introduce one substantive change, which 
fits with Katz and Mair’s expectations: there some encouragement given to party 
units to extend participation in candidate selection.  Previously, party units had a free 
choice whether to involve all members in candidate selection, or just delegates; the 
Bürgerpartei reforms allow them to retain this choice (while encouraging all-member 
involvement), but they allow 25% of the members of a party district, or branches to 
convene a meeting to change the method of selection (CDU 2003: 10).  This has 
now been introduced, though by no means universally: according to a senior CDU 
official, some 60% of party units now involve all members in candidate selection, 
rather than just delegates (Interview, June 2011).  In Germany’s mixed-member 
electoral system, too, some MPs are elected from the party list rather than by direct 
election, decisions on the composition of the party list are decided upon by 
conferences of delegates, based upon extensive preparatory discussions and 
negotiations by party functionaries, and not by all members.   Even where all 
members are involved, in practice there is every chance they will be presented with a 
fait accompli, with a particular candidate certain to win as a result of prior 
negotiations (Wigbers 2012).  In each case, the whip hand is held by party 
functionaries below the national level: in the case of decisions upon individual 
constituencies, the relevant Kreisverband chair and executive is decisive, while in 
the case of state lists, negotiations are conducted within the state party (though 
paying careful attention to geographical balance, and thus closely involving the level 
or levels below). 
 
The changes also offered some encouragement to involve members in all-member 
ballots on both personnel decisions (typically the choice of a leading candidate or a 
Land-level party chair) – a possibility which already existed – and also, in a new 
proposal, on policy matters.  The hurdle for such an initiative is set high, with one 
third of party units needing to request such a ballot, and the majority of the executive 
of the relevant level then agreeing (CDU 2003: 11), so in practice decisions upon 
when to involve all members are taken by functionaries at each level.  There has, to 
date, been no involvement of all members in taking policy decisions, while elites 
have carried out an all-member ballot to determine party office-holders only very 
sporadically: typically when there is a stalemate situation, the elite has no 
preference, or where there is a risk of grave internal conflict (Jun 2009: 187). 
 
The text of the Bürgerpartei document emphasised, at great length, how non-
members should be encouraged to be involved in party decisions, arguing for 
opening rather than a “closed shop”, (CDU 2003: 6), and encouraging less 
discussion of constitutional mattes so that party conferences become more 
interesting (ibid: 7).  However, in practice there has, to date, been no substantive 
involvement of non-members in decisions upon party policy, and there has been no 
interest in opening candidate selection processes to non-members. 
 
There are other areas, too, where the CDU’s resistance to change appears to 
confound Katz and Mair’s expectations.  In terms of resourcing, analysis of the 
party’s accounts, as submitted to the Bundestag authorities each year, shows that 
the proportion of expenditure by the party centrally is just 29%, with 20% being spent 
12 
 
at the level of the Landesverbände, and the remaining 51% being spent below that 
level (Bundestag 2011); levels of central expenditure have been falling, rather than 
rising (Feser 2010).  Staffing is also decentralised, and in fact there has been a 
reduction in staffing at the party’s headquarters, as a result of a party finance 
scandal, in the period since the 1998 election (Bösch, 2005: 180). 
 
Sub-national party units, and in particular the Kreisverbände, have been careful to 
safeguard the autonomy in other ways, too.  For instance, the CDU decentralises its 
membership administration to this level, rather than retaining a national register, in 
spite of the obvious economies of scale this might offer; fundraising has also been 
almost completely left to the Kreisverbände, with the result that some do not pull 
their weight.  Campaign organisation, too, is substantially decentralised.  In state 
elections, the national party plays a supporting role, not a leadership one, while in 
federal elections the campaign at the level of the constituencies remains 
decentralised: there is the “offer” of central support, but there is no central direction 
as such (Interview with CDU official, June 2011). 
 
b. Professionalisation of the CDU? 
 
The visitor to the CDU’s splendid glass headquarters in central Berlin, the Konrad-
Adenauer-Haus, would perhaps gain the impression of a seriously modern 
organisation.  However, in practice, although this level of the party is indeed highly 
professionalised, the decentralisation and fiercely-guarded autonomy of the sub-
national units (in particular the party districts), in such areas as campaigning, 
fundraising, and membership administration means that very substantial boundaries 
are set to such professionalisation. 
 
Outside agencies are now routinely involved in the design of campaign slogans, 
advertising materials and the like, in campaigns at all levels of the party (Interview 
CDU federal official, June 2011; Interview CDU Landesverband official, June 2011).  
The federal party also developed a so-called Citizen-Relationship-Management 
programme, which contains a database of policy enquiries and other contact with the 
party from the general public, and allows for the creation of standardised responses 
and subsequent follow-up in future campaigns.  As the name implies, this draws 
upon the Customer Relationship Management now common amongst companies 
and public sector organisations (Schröder / Neumann: 2010).  It is now the case that 
most (although not all) Landesverbände are linked into this system, and it has, in the 
view of the party HQ, proved extremely useful (Interview, CDU federal official, June 
2011). 
 
This professionalisation at the central level is not always reflected beneath the 
national level.  In particular, the central party HQ has to see itself as making an ‘offer’ 
to the sub-national units, especially the Kreisverbände, but it is up to them whether 
they take up the offer.  Some do, but many don’t: for instance, when a web 
programme to allow the easy and cheap creation of party websites (fitting the CDU’s 
corporate identify) was set up, take-up was around 20%.  Similarly, a wide range of 
courses is offered by the party’s HQ, for instance in training candidates, sharing 
campaigning best practice or assisting with web design: these are often over-
subscribed, but in practice the same Kreisverbände take up the offer, with a high 
proportion not engaging.  Staff at the party HQ have to be acutely sensitive to any 
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perception of trying to engage in hostile ‘take-overs’ of sub-national units, and need 
to respect their autonomy; in some cases, this prevents reform for which the 
functional case might otherwise be compelling.  This sets significant boundaries to 
professionalisation. Limits on the use of technology are also placed by the German 
historical context: in particular, commercially available databases with personal 
information have not been used for political campaigning as widely as might have 
been expected (Interview, CDU federal official, June 2011).  
 
In terms of the professionalisation in political career paths, there appears to be some 
evidence for this, although again the point should not be over-stated.  As early as 
1997, Saalfeld claimed that “There is little doubt in the literature that politics in 
Germany has increasingly become a professional career” (Saalfeld, 1997: 33).  For a 
career as a CDU parliamentarian, a long-standing period of party membership is 
near to being a prerequisite: It is no surprise that Gruber finds that over 40% of 
senior CDU politicians had joined the party by the age of 20, rising to 70% by the 
age of 30 (if politicians born in the former GDR were taken out, these figures would 
presumably be higher) (Gruber 2007).  By contrast, there are increasing possibilities 
for young party members to forge a career path without a great deal of engagement 
with the broad mass of party members, and instead moving from university (perhaps 
with involvement in a political youth organisation) into a ministry or another part of 
the executive (Interview, Chair of CDU interest association, June 2011) 
 
Some further evidence for professionalisation concerns the level of education of 
politicians, compared to the broad mass of party members.  Gruber finds that over 
90% of top German politicians are educated to university level, rising to nearly 94% 
amongst younger MPs (ibid: 7).  This is significantly higher than amongst the wider 
CDU membership, where 46% has done at least Abitur and / or been to university 
(Neu 2009: 165), and the contrast with branch executive committees is even 
stronger (Spier 2010). 
 
 
c. Summary 
 
This short analysis of the CDU has provided even clearer evidence than that of the 
British Conservatives to the slow and contingent nature of party organisational 
change.  Notwithstanding the changes in the environment in which German parties 
operate (and also the shock of election defeats), organisational centralisation is 
barely visible: instead, the power of sub-national units of the organisation appears 
very firmly entrenched.  Moreover, there is no real sense of a “stratarchy” of mutually 
independent elites being created: rather, there are important inter-locking 
mechanisms which mean that the party’s core executive committee has substantial 
representation from those representing the level of the Länder.  Nor has power 
shifted radically to members: in terms of candidate selection, there has been only a 
modest shift towards power shifting form functionaries to members (and in practice 
members may formally end up “ratifying” a decision which has long since been taken 
by local functionaries); in terms of other internal decisions, the mass of members are 
only involved in decisions when it is in the interests of elites to involve them.  
 
There are some trends towards professionalisation of the CDU, both in terms of its 
party organisation and its career paths.  However, in the case of its organisation, this 
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process is substantially restricted by decentralised nature of the party organisation.  
In both cases, it might almost be appropriate to discern parallel structures: on the 
one hand, there is a highly professionalised party headquarters, leadership and 
senior parliamentary party, and on the other hand a network of district parties with a 
radically different, far less professionalised modus operandi.   
 
Webb (2000: 195) makes the point that the Conservative Party leader William Hague 
appeared to focus upon organisational renewal because, compared to programmatic 
reform, it was “a somewhat less thorny nettle to grasp”.  In the case of the CDU, the 
opposite might be the case: the party leadership has, in particular since re-entering 
government in 2005, had to take the party’s grassroots on a long and contentious 
journey towards the ideological centre ground, leaving no political capital spare for 
the modernisation of party structures. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Notwithstanding the different contexts, the picture that emerges from the 
examination of our two cases is that party organisational change of the sort 
envisaged by Katz and Mair by no means simply flows from an environmental 
stimulus.  In the case of the Conservative Party, there was some power shift – both 
upwards to the leadership, and downwards towards all members – away from local 
functionaries.  However, in the cases of the most major sets of reforms (pursued 
after the 1997 and 2005 elections), the endogenous condition of a change of 
leadership, following the “external shock” of an electoral defeat, was required, and in 
each case, rather than a simple transfer of power, there emerged significant 
compromise and a period of tense contestation of power between the different levels 
of the party.   In the case of the CDU, there is almost no evidence of centralisation in 
organisational power away from local functionaries towards party leaders; there has 
been a modest transfer of power from local functionaries towards individual 
members in the field of candidate selection, but this is not replicated in other aspects 
of the party’s organisation.   
 
Interestingly, in the case of the Conservatives, experiments with primary elections 
have seen some marginal blurring of the boundaries between members and non-
members – and with relatively little resistance, albeit some grumbling.   Within the 
CDU, formal involvement of non-members in candidate selection would not conform 
with German party law, but in any case has not been proposed by party leaderships, 
and exhortations to involve non-members in party activity more widely do not appear 
to have been heeded.  There is, however, evidence In both parties, of 
professionalisation in campaign activity.  However, especially with the CDU but also 
the Conservatives to some degree, this has occurred outside, rather than within, the 
existing local organisational structures.  This points to another, important possibility 
for party organisations, namely that a first response to environmental pressures to 
professionalise may result not be internal adaptation but the creation (often 
contested) of alternative, professional structures with an appropriate functional shift – 
be that in handling communications at the party’s headquarters, or arranging 
telephone campaigning: indeed, this may be the only way in which such 
modernisation is viable. 
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In the case of the Conservative Party, both major reforms came about immediately 
after – and indeed as a result of – a change, just as Harmel and Janda (1994) 
anticipated: in this case, at least, there appears to be a “window of opportunity” 
presented to undertake organisational reform.  In the case of the CDU, however, 
notwithstanding two changes of leader (as well as “external shocks” of election 
defeats, and of course the environmental pressures for change), new leaders either 
did not discern, or did not take advantage of, such a window.  As a result, 
Panebianco’s (1988) claim that party organisational reform will not happen if neither 
exogenous nor endogenous prerequisites are present appears under-stated.  
Actually, there is no more an automatic link between leadership change and 
organisational reform, than there is between environmental pressures for change 
and change itself.  In understanding the way parties mediate pressures for change, 
these cases do appear to suggest that a certain “path dependence” is present.  In 
the case of the Conservative Party, for instance, the relative openness to primaries 
participation may well reflect the fact that activism among Tories was traditionally 
more social and inclusive than overtly political and based on big distinctions between 
card-carrying members and the rest.  In Germany, the powerful decentralising forces 
in the CDU’s organisation account for the slowness and difficulty of party 
organisational reform. 
 
In a range of areas, then, Katz and Mair’s clear and parsimonious predictions about 
the way in which party organisations will respond to environmental pressures for 
change seem to be confirmed.  However, once one scratches beneath the surface, 
change is an altogether more complicated, contingent, slower and messier process 
than their account would suggest.  As Harmel and Janda stress, change doesn’t just 
happen.  It can only come about through the action (and interaction) of events and 
people, by no means all of whom have to be the ‘great men’ who go down in history. 
Both scholars, and would-be political reformers underestimate the ability of internal 
actors both to thwart and drive change by exercising agency, and indeed political 
power, at their peril. 
 
. 
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